

*Research Article*

## **The Trump Effect on Deglobalisation: Empirical Evidence of the Cooperation Paradox amid Technological Acceleration**

*Marcel Welsen, and Lukasz Sulkowski*

**Abstract.** This study investigates the economic, sociological, and political consequences of Donald Trump’s 2025 protectionist trade policies, aiming to understand how public experiences influence attitudes toward international cooperation. It addresses gaps in existing research by revealing that negative policy experiences may paradoxically strengthen support for multilateralism. The analysis is contextualized within accelerating scientific and technological progress, particularly developments in information and communication technologies, arguing that forces once driving hyper-globalization now increasingly contribute to selective deglobalization. A convergent parallel mixed-methods design is applied, combining a systematic literature review of 160 sources (2016–2025) with an original survey of 209 respondents from 17 countries. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics, Pearson’s correlation coefficients, and thematic analysis to explore relationships between economic consequences, social attitudes, and political preferences. Results reveal a significant “cooperation paradox:” among respondents reporting negative national impacts from Trump’s policies (67.9%), support for international cooperation remains very high (85.2%), with a statistically significant negative correlation between perceived national harm and opposition to cooperation ( $r = -0.20$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). The study also identifies a “macro–personal disconnect,” where perceptions of national economic harm exceed reported personal financial deterioration ( $r = -0.44$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). These findings provide the first empirical evidence of this cooperation paradox, challenging theories linking negative economic experiences with isolationism. The study introduces selective deglobalisation as a theoretical concept describing rational public learning, where harmful policies are rejected while commitment to revised multilateral frameworks is reinforced. Integrating technological transformation into this analysis deepens understanding of public opinion on globalization and offers valuable insights for policymakers.

**Keywords:** deglobalisation; international cooperation; cooperation paradox; selective deglobalisation; technological acceleration; information and communication technology; digital nationalism.

**Author(s):****Marcel Welsen**

WSB University, 1C Zygmunt Cieplak, 41-300 Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland

Email: marcel.welsen@student.wsb.edu.pl

<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9456-1930>

**Lukasz Sulkowski**

Institute of Public Affairs, Jagiellonian University, Gołębia 24, 31-007 Kraków, Poland

Email: lukasz.sulkowski@uj.edu.pl

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1248-2743>

Corresponding Author: Marcel Welsen, marcel.welsen@student.wsb.edu.pl

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*Marcel Welsen, and Lukasz Sulkowski*  
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## 1. Introduction

The re-election of Donald Trump in 2024 and his implementation of aggressive trade policies have raised new questions about the future of globalisation and global economic stability. Within days of taking office, Trump left the OECD's global tax deal negotiation by executive order [1], introduced tariffs from 25% to 145% on various trading partners [2], affecting over \$2.3 trillion worth of imports and marking the most significant protectionist shift in US trade policy since the 1930s [3]. Implementation was possible through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) by declaring a national emergency to impose a 10% baseline tariff on all countries effective 5 April 2025, rising to individualised rates based on trade deficits [4; 5]. The average applied US tariff rate had risen from 2.5% to an estimated 27% by July 2025 – the highest level in over a century [6–8].

These policies together with exit from multilateralism can be seen as fundamental challenge to post-World War II liberal international order and principles of economic integration, which defined global commerce for decades [9–13]. Besides economic disruption, Trump's increasingly extreme rhetoric has challenged democratic norms, threatened institutional independence, and reshaped public discourse around globalisation in ways that undermine social cohesion and institutional trust [14–17]. These developments have created unprecedented conditions for examining how protectionist experiences shape public attitudes toward international cooperation, elite accountability, and the future of global governance [11; 12; 18].

### 1.1. Research Context and Theoretical Framework

Current trade tensions occur within the broader context of “deglobalisation” or retreat from global economic integration [19–23]. It is a phenomenon that includes shifting attitudes toward international cooperation, growth of economic nationalism, and strong doubt about multilateral institutions [24–26]. Scholars describe it as a shift from rapid “hyper-globalisation” to “slowbalisation,” marked by stagnating trade-to-Gross-Domestic Product (GDP) ratios and increasing economic fragmentation [27; 28].

A technological foundation is required to understand this shift. Previously, the rapid progress in information and communication technologies (ICT) enabled hyper-globalization from the 1990s onward, dramatically lowering communication costs and facilitating coordination of geographically dispersed supply chains [20; 29; 30]. However, selective deglobalization under different political-economic conditions paradoxically facilitates the same ICT innovations. Advanced manufacturing automation can reduce labour cost, which previously drove offshoring and at the same time digital technologies enable new forms of state control over economic activities [31–33].

As Baldwin [34] characterizes it in his analysis of Trump's second-term policies, this represents a 'Great Trade Hack'—an attempt to breach the global trading system's established frameworks through aggressive unilateral tariffs that exploit technological capabilities for strategic economic advantage.

In addition to that, it also has a political dimension. Recent discussion about 'digital sovereignty' and 'digital nationalism' is highlighting how technology is used by states to assert control over

data flows and digital infrastructure, leading to fragmentation of the once-borderless internet [35–39]. Bradford [40] further demonstrates how this regulatory fragmentation creates a 'digital regulation-innovation paradox' with both barriers and opportunities in the digital economy.

Policies such as data localization and online censorship -often justified by security or privacy concerns – can act as digital-era protectionism that create barriers to information flows analogous to traditional trade barriers [41]. Thus, accelerating technological progress has become a sword with two edges in the deglobalisation paradigm: the same forces that once propelled integration now enable more selective forms of international engagement.

To systematically analyse these interconnected dynamics, this study develops the COPAR (COoperation PARadox) framework. This conceptual model integrates policy inputs (Trump's protectionist measures), experienced impacts (economic harm at country and personal levels), and attitudinal outcomes (support for international cooperation) within the context of technological acceleration. The framework examines whether negative protectionist experiences influence support for multilateral cooperation, and if so, what this reveals about contemporary globalisation dynamics. The framework, populated with empirical findings, is presented in Figure 2 (Section 5.1).

Trump's approach to trade represents a radical change from traditional U.S. leadership in the global economy [42]. As argued by Stiglitz [43], these policies are based on fundamental misunderstandings of international trade and are likely to increase trade deficits whilst lowering living standards. In the official document of the Office of the United States Trade Representative [44] it is described as prioritising a “Production Economy” through comprehensive trade policy frameworks designed to increase domestic manufacturing, raise wages, and strengthen national defence capabilities. Global supply chains, international cooperation and the future of economic integration will be heavily impacted [45–47].

The relevance of the investigation is demonstrated by the European Commission's [27] assessment, that global value chains facing increasing pressure from trade restrictions and geo-economic fragmentation. As warned by the World Economic Forum [48] that the world is at a critical inflection point where systemic risks are rising in magnitude and complexity. To understand how deglobalisation processes being catalysed by Trump's policies is essential for policymakers, businesses, and scholars who have to navigate an increasingly fragmented global economy [49; 50]. This study combines economic, sociological and political analyses to provide a comprehensive assessment of how protectionist policies reshape not only trade flows but also public attitudes and institutional structures that underpin the global order during this era of 'geostrategic globalisation' [51].

## ***1.2. Research Questions***

This study analyses three interconnected research questions spanning economic, sociological, and political dimensions.

### ***1.2.1. RQ1 (Economic Dimensions)***

How do individuals across different countries and industries experience the economic effects of Trump's trade restrictions and protectionist policies? This question looks at the persistence and evolution of Trump's "America First" trade programme, as framed by the administration's official policy agenda and key economic impact analyses [44].

### *1.2.2. RQ2 (Sociological Dimensions)*

How Trump's nationalist and populist narratives have systematically influenced public attitudes toward globalisation and international cooperation, and what are the implications for democratic governance and policy sustainability? This question investigates how "globalisation shocks" and cultural backlash act as a driver for populist support, drawing from major theories on anti-globalisation sentiment [25; 52–56].

### *1.2.3. RQ3 (Political Dimensions)*

What is the impact that Trump administration's anti-globalisation position have on multilateral institutions and trust in global governance, and how do these changes affect the future viability of international cooperation mechanisms? This question examines how Trump's policies have affected multilateralism and global governance, based on studies showing challenges to the foundations of the post-war liberal order [11; 57–60].

## ***1.3. Article Structure***

The sections of this paper are organised as follows. Section 2 provides a comprehensive literature review across economic, sociological, and political dimensions, concluding with the identification of research gaps and study objectives. Section 3 details the research methodology, including survey design, sample characteristics, and data analysis strategy. Section 4 presents the empirical results organised according to the three research questions. Section 5 discusses theoretical contributions, policy implications, limitations, and future research directions.

## **2. Literature Review**

The scientific investigation of Trump's impact on deglobalisation encompasses three interconnected dimensions: economic transformations in trade policy and supply chains, sociological shifts in nationalism and public opinion, and political challenges to multilateralism and institutional trust. This review synthesises those sources to identify major themes, theoretical contributions, and research gaps.

### ***2.1. Economic Dimensions: Trade Policy and Supply Chains***

The economic impacts of Trump's tariffs have been substantial. Earlier assessments found 2018 tariffs increased US consumer costs by \$3.2 billion monthly [61], with total losses of \$51 billion (0.27% of GDP) [62]. 2018 tariffs causing a \$51 billion loss to US consumers and firms, this represents 0.27% of GDP. Despite such documented harm, protectionist policies intensified during Trump's second presidency.

Theoretical frameworks help understand economic disruption mechanisms. Blanchard et al. [63] demonstrated that countries with deeper supply chain connections are less likely to impose high tariffs, as tariffs hurt companies relying on international production networks. Baqaee and Farhi [64; 65] show how tariff shocks spread across production networks, amplifying welfare effects, while Handley et al. [66] found exporters relying on tariffed imports experienced 2-4% lower exports. Despite these documented supply chain vulnerabilities, Trump's administration escalated tariff use.

Rather than complete deglobalisation, scholars identify “slowbalisation” – selective reconfiguration where trade reorients geographically rather than retreating uniformly [20; 67; 68]. Boehm et al. [69] explain persistence of tariff effects through slow trade elasticities (short-run: -0.76, long-run: -1.75 to -2.25), meaning that tariff damages are intensifying over time rather than diminishing, whilst Caliendo et al. [70] demonstrate how Trump's tariffs are reversing welfare gains from previous liberalisation. A theoretical tension seems to be created because if tariff damages are getting more intensive as suggested by Boehm [69], then growing domestic opposition to such policies would be created.

Bown [71] tracks how tariffs justified as national security threats caused widespread retaliation and trade disruption. York and Durante [3] estimate Trump's tariffs increased taxes by \$1,219 per US household in 2025, reducing long-run GDP by 0.8% and eliminating 788,000 jobs. The Budget Lab [7] reports the US effective tariff rate reached 18.3%—the highest since 1934—with \$2,400 loss per household. Approximately \$1.7 trillion of US imports are affected [2].

Major trading partners introduced countermeasures: China's tariffs peaked at 147.6% before reducing to 32.6% following Geneva negotiations [71]. Canada imposed 25% tariffs on \$127.5 billion of US exports; and the EU reached agreement for 15% tariffs [3; 72; 73]. The Penn Wharton Budget Model [74] projects tariffs will reduce long-run US GDP by 6% and wages by 5%, with \$22,000 lifetime losses for middle-income households. California alone incurred \$11.3 billion in tariff costs with 64,000 jobs at risk [75].

German economic institutes downgraded Germany's 2025 growth forecast to zero percent due to Trump's tariff policy [76]. The IFO Institute [77] forecast that German exports to the US will fall 14.9%, with automotive declining 32% and pharmaceuticals 35%. The European Central Bank estimates reduced eurozone GDP growth [28], though Bruegel estimates a more limited 0.3% GDP decline [78].

Supply chains are transforming in response, with companies relocating to politically aligned countries. Trump's 25% auto tariffs granted exemptions for United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)-compliant parts from Canada and Mexico, reflecting integrated North American supply chains [79; 80]. This exemplifies broader “friend-shoring” responses [81-83]. US exporters experienced a 43% week-over-week container drop through April 2025, with agricultural exports declining 17% at major ports [84; 85]. Manufacturers increasingly pursue nearshoring or reshoring, shifting supply chains toward geographically and politically aligned partners [86–89].

Tariffs significantly reduce US and global economic growth and increase inflation, though according to several working papers from Peterson Institute for International Economics

outcomes were less severe than original assumptions because of exemptions and adjustments [5; 73; 90]. Other researches show that ‘bystander’ countries to the US-China trade war seized opportunities to boost global exports of tariffed goods, with trade shifting rather than declining overall [47; 91].

These mixed findings from the literature highlight the gap for understanding. The economic research clearly documents substantial cost, but it does not explain why such policies still receive that much political support or how they affect public attitudes toward international cooperation.

## **2.2. Sociological Dimensions: Nationalism and Public Opinion**

Sociological research demonstrates how cultural and economic shocks drive nationalism. Hetherington and Weiler [92] argue polarisation stems from diverging worldviews based on authoritarianism, while Inglehart and Norris [52] attribute populism to cultural backlash, linking it to traditionalist values, anti-immigrant attitudes, and mistrust of governance. Populist governments across the political spectrum tend to increase state economic control [93–96], revealing tension between economic and cultural explanations of populist support.

Colantone and Stanig [53; 54] show that regions in Europe with higher Chinese import exposure experienced approximately 2 percentage point increases in radical-right vote share, with effects extending beyond directly impacted workers. Clayton et al. [14] demonstrate how elite rhetoric undermines democratic norms, while Rodrik [25] demonstrates that globalisation shocks affecting culture and identity drive populist movements, especially right-wing ones, explaining how Trump’s actions both respond to and strengthen nationalist sentiments.

Based on that findings, economic and cultural factors might be more intertwined than previously thought, yet they focus primarily on voting behaviour instead of broader attitudes toward international cooperation.

Essig et al. [56] identified a measurable “Trump effect” on public trade attitudes, finding that Trump supporters became significantly more likely to oppose free trade and favour protectionist positions. This effect was depending on how much political knowledge voters had, it shows that elite rhetoric is able to change opinions of people who know about politics, especially when political debate gets heated. Skonieczny and Sherel [15] demonstrate that Trump’s populist narratives from his first presidency continue to influence US-China trade policies under Biden administration from 2020 to 2024, which is an example of how populist language has lasting effects in limiting the choice of policies.

A theoretical explanation of national backlist is provided by the the comprehensive meta-analysis from [97], looking into 36 studies. According to his analysis, economic insecurity contributes to populist support, which can explain recent increase in populism. For right-wing populism this effect becomes even stronger, where key shocks occur, including austerity, bank failures, labour market disruptions, and foreign debt crises [98].

Wike [55] documents declining favourable opinions of the US across 24 nations, with low confidence in President Trump’s handling of world affairs – a median of only 34% expressing

confidence and 62% expressing little or no confidence. According to a recent survey from YouGov, 69% of respondent in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK favor tariffs in response against the US [99,100] indicating a drop in positive Opinion towards United States after Trump's re-election.

Important questions are raised from those pattern, about if decline in confidence in US leadership causes broader scepticism about international cooperation, or whether publics distinguish between specific policies and institutional frameworks.

### ***2.3. Political Dimensions: Multilateralism and Institutional Trust***

Political science literature documents systematic challenges to multilateral institutions. Ikenberry [9] suggests that while American hegemonic organisation of liberal order is weakening, principles of liberal internationalism remain relevant but require reinvention. Börzel and Zürn [26] investigate transition from liberal multilateralism to “postnational liberalism,” focusing on how institutional authority has generated legitimacy contestations. These studies focus on institutional changes rather than how ordinary people's attitudes toward cooperation change during such crises.

Hooghe et al. [101] present a comprehensive theory of international organisation (IO), showing how IO structure responds to functional needs while they need to balance desire for national self-rule. Their analysis of 76 IOs from 1950 to 2010 provides context and understanding about how Trump's proposals contradicts with long-standing norms of international cooperation.

According to Hopewell's [102] argues the multilateral trading system crisis predates Trump but was accelerated by his policies, weakening US institutional power within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Zaccaria [103], interviewing 22 WTO officials, details how the Trump administration rendered the WTO Appellate Body inoperative by blocking judge appointments, demonstrating how powerful states exploit institutional designs [104]. These studies show institutional breakdown but focus on political elites rather than public attitudes toward cooperation.

Analysis by Dijkstra [105] confirms that different international organisations varied significantly in their ability to pursue survival strategies during the Trump administration, with NATO and UNFCCC officials successfully adapting while WTO officials lacked leadership and organisational structure to formulate effective responses [106].

Research finds populist governments rarely fully withdraw from institutions but engage in tactical disengagement through criticism, obstruction, extortion, and selective exit [25; 107], [108], suggesting Trump's impact on multilateralism may be more complex than simple withdrawal.

Ettinger and Collins [59] characterised Trump as a “reactionary norm entrepreneur” whose strong rejections of existing norms fundamentally undermine global governance institutions. Regilme [109] examines US foreign aid under Trump, finding the administration's ambivalence and proposed budget cuts undermined American credibility as a development partner. Trump's reluctance to pursue global engagement led already before his second Presidency to declining

US legitimacy, particularly as China increased influence through the Belt and Road Initiative [110].

The WTO crisis severity is confirmed by recent evidence and was already acute before Trump's renewed attacks to the WTO [111]. Hopewell [60] reports 24 panel rulings appealed into the void as of November 2024, with 64% of panel reports (2020-2023) facing this fate. While the US accounts for nine appeals, developing countries now represent over half, suggesting crisis spread beyond US obstructionism—what Hopewell terms the ‘unravelling of the trade legal order.’

Short after Trump's second presidency he withdraw from World Health Organization [112] and other International Organisations [113]. Patrick [12] examined how Trump used executive orders to attempt withdrawal from organisations like the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and WHO. Recent analysis by Baldwin [34] demonstrates how Trump's trade policies follow an emotional rather than economic logic, characterizing them as a ‘Great Trade Hack’ that attempts to breach the global trading system's institutional frameworks through aggressive unilateral tariffs.

Contemporary analysis by Biersteker [18] argues that multilateralism and the rules-based international order are being replaced by illiberal nationalism, regional governance, and alternative global leadership dynamics under Trump's return to power [18].

However, recent scholarship suggests international organisations are not powerless against populist challenges, with institutions developing tools to minimize US influence by seeking alternative resources and expanding their own capacities. Multilateralism Can Survive Trump Foreign Affairs. Recent research discovers complicated patterns of institutional adaptation and resistance. Sapir [114] suggests the EU create a multilateral initiative with countries dedicated to free, rules-based trade instead of just retaliating against US tariffs, consistent with emerging ‘selective multilateralism’ where Trump maintains conditional support for institutions like the IMF when they align with US priorities [115]. The World Economic Forum emphasises that international cooperation remains important but is becoming harder due to fragmentation, geopolitics, and lack of trust [116].

Gopinath et al. [117] show trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows between geopolitically distant blocs have declined, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, by using gravity model estimations. They identified the nonaligned “connector” countries that are becoming relevant as bridges between blocs, in contrast to Cold War tendencies and they suggest new forms of multilateral collaboration may become stronger even if established institutions get weaker.

Current research studies what happens to institutions (they break down or adapt), but does not study what happens to public opinion about those institutions.

#### ***2.4. Research Gap and Study Objectives***

Existing research on Trump's trade policies focused mainly on his first presidency and immediate economic impacts but did not analyse the interplay between economic, sociological, and political dimensions [56; 61; 62; 91; 118; 119].

Four critical gaps are identified in this study. First, economic studies are documenting trade impacts [3; 62], and sociological research is looking into attitude shifts [54; 56], but only few integrate dimensions to understand mutual reinforcement [25; 43; 120–122]. Second, while previous research suggested that protectionism might lead to isolationism [25], it failed to explain how the negative experiences may paradoxically enhance international collaboration support. Third, frameworks or concepts are missing for understanding “selective deglobalisation” – where policy objections coexist with international engagement support. Fourth, how policy experiences shape institutional preferences, tracked through longitudinal studies over time is missing [69; 110; 123; 124].

World-systems analysis suggests that trade wars reflect structural global economic changes [42; 125; 126]. Even there are researches available that examined specific aspects like the “Trump effect” [56] or WTO crisis [103], the integration across dimensions remains limited. The current academic status quo [10; 59] hinders to fully understand how protectionist policies drive broader transformations or changes.


With this study these gaps will be addressed by providing an empirical evidence of a ‘cooperation paradox’ where negative protectionist experiences correlate with increased international cooperation support, contradicting established isolationism theories [25; 53; 97; 98]. While policy learning theories suggest failures can trigger paradigm shifts [127; 128], no existing framework predicted protectionist harm would specifically enhance multilateral preferences.

To explain this paradox, this paper introduces the theoretical concept of ‘selective deglobalisation.’ We define this as a process of rational policy learning in which publics, having experienced the negative consequences and ‘major setbacks’ of protectionism [22; 45], consciously reject specific harmful policies while reinforcing their commitment to institutional frameworks of multilateralism. This builds on ‘slowbalisation’ observations [20; 129] and goes beyond binary globalisation conceptualizations [130; 131] by explaining the active mechanism behind public preference formation.

### **3. Methodology**

#### ***3.1. Mixed-Methods Design***

This study utilizes a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, which is simultaneously collecting and analyzing qualitative (literature review) and quantitative (survey) data, to offer complementary insights into the research questions [132; 133]. Figure 1 illustrates this methodological approach, showing how the qualitative strand (systematic literature review) and quantitative strand (survey analysis) were conducted simultaneously and integrated during the interpretation and synthesis phase to generate the study's key findings.



**Figure 1.** Convergent Parallel Mixed-Methods Design.

Source: Author's Own Elaboration.

This approach is consistent with established mixed-methods frameworks that emphasize methodological triangulation for complex social phenomena [134]. The analytical process was guided by the COPAR framework (see Figure 2, Section 5.1), which structured the integration of qualitative and quantitative findings across the three research dimensions: economic impacts, sociological attitudes, and political preferences regarding international cooperation. In this research, the qualitative component offers theoretical grounding and contextual understanding, whereas the quantitative survey data provides empirical validation and discovers patterns not addressed in current literature. Integration takes place during the interpretation stage, wherein findings from both research streams are compared, contrasted, and synthesized [135] to develop the concept of “selective deglobalisation.” This design choice aligns with the study’s goals to document existing knowledge and generate new theoretical insights from data [136].

This systematic review follows PRISMA 2020 guidelines [137] and synthesizes sources from academic journals, policy reports, and institutional publications from 2016 to 2025. The use of systematic reviews to synthesise evidence is increasingly common in social sciences for ensuring rigour and transparency [138]. Due to the contemporary nature of Trump’s second-term policies, the review incorporates recent government documents, executive orders, and policy statements alongside peer-reviewed literature to capture ongoing developments that have not yet been fully analysed in academic publications.

Following systematic screening procedures and application of inclusion criteria [139], empirical focus on Trump’s policies, publication in English and German, and relevance to at least one research dimension - the final analysis after the Peer review incorporates 160 sources including additional literature added after the peer review process. The sources were grouped into 68 academic journal articles, 34 think tank/policy reports, 12 government documents, 7 industry analyses, 10 news/media sources and 29 uncategorized sources.

### 3.2. Survey Design and Data Collection

The 18 questions in the survey were based on the three research questions as well as based on the literature review. The goal was to evaluate Trump's trade policies in terms of their impact on the economic-, sociological- and political dimensions, utilizing various formats such as Likert scales (1-5), multiple choice questions and open-ended questions [140; 141]. Data were collected from 8 until 30 July 2025, using online distribution through academic networks and survey platforms.

The conduction of this study was done in accordance with ethical guidelines for human subjects research. Before participation, all survey participants provided informed consent through the survey introduction. Opinions on trade policies were collected anonymous without any personal information. Participation was voluntary and participants could withdraw at any time. Formal ethics committee approval was not required for this minimal-risk study as determined by institutional guidelines for anonymous survey research. Information were collected without personal identifying information and therefore with minimal risk to participants. No participants are identifiable in this research.

### 3.3. Sample Characteristics

The survey collected 209 responses from participants across 17 countries (see Table 1 for complete sample characteristics). Geographic distribution shows concentration in developed economies, with the United States accounting for 41.6% (n=87) of respondents, followed by the United Kingdom at 22.0% (n=46), Germany at 16.3% (n=34), and Poland at 5.7% (n=12). Remaining 14.4% includes participants from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, India, China, Netherlands, Austria, Turkey, France, Czech Republic, Sweden, Belgium, and UAE.

**Table 1.** Sample Characteristics (N=209).

Characteristic	Category	n	%
Geographic Distribution	United States	87	41.6
	United Kingdom	46	22
	Germany	34	16.3
	Poland	12	5.7
	Other (13 countries)	30	14.4
Age Distribution	30-44 years	95	45.5
	45-59 years	53	25.4
	18-29 years	44	21.1
	60+ years	17	8.1
Sector Representation	Information Technology	51	24.4
	Education	27	12.9
	E-Commerce	26	12.4
	Trade / Logistics	22	10.5
	Manufacturing/Production	18	8.6

Healthcare	18	8.6
Finance	14	6.7
Students	15	7.2
Other sectors	18	8.6

Source: Authors' Survey Data.

Distribution of age shows mainly of working-age professionals: 45.5% (n=95) aged 30-44 years, 25.4% (n=53) aged 45-59 years, 21.1% (n=44) aged 18-29 years, and 8.1% (n=17) aged 60 and above.

Sectors are broadly represented, covering Information Technology at 24.4% (n=51), followed by Education (12.9%, n=27), E-Commerce (12.4%, n=26), Trade/Logistics (10.5%, n=22), Manufacturing/Production (8.6%, n=18), Healthcare (8.6%, n=18), Finance (6.7%, n=14), and Students (7.2%, n=15). This diversity assures understanding of impacts across trade-exposed and protected sectors, aligning with theoretical expectations from Fajgelbaum et al. [62,91] regarding sectoral heterogeneity in trade war effects.

### 3.4. Data Analysis Strategy

The analytical strategy employs multiple statistical techniques to examine relationships between variables and test theoretical propositions [142]. Descriptive statistics summarise the sample and key variables. Correlation analysis explores associations, for example between country-level impacts (Question 3) and sector-level impacts (Question 4), revealing strong correlation ( $r=0.61$ ,  $p<.001$ ) that validates measurement consistency (see Appendix A for the complete correlation matrix and descriptive statistics). Cross-tabulation and group comparison tests were used to examine how demographic variables (country, age, sector) relate to impact perceptions and policy attitudes. For example, the analysis shows that German respondents report the highest negative impact rates (79.4%), while age groups show remarkably consistent negative perceptions (65.9% to 70.6% across all cohorts).

Finally, correlation analysis discovers the paradox central to the “selective deglobalisation” concept: a significant negative correlation ( $r = -0.20$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) between negative impact perceptions (Q3) and cooperation support (Q15). This statistical relationship underlies the descriptive finding that despite 67.9% reporting negative impacts, 85.2% strongly support international cooperation.

We used Python-based AI tools for quantitative analysis with pandas for data processing [143] and SciPy.stats module for statistical analysis [144]. Following standard practices in behavioural sciences [145; 146], statistical processes included percentage calculations, 95% confidence intervals for proportions, and Pearson's correlation coefficients (see Appendix B for comprehensive mathematical formulas). We used listwise deletion to address missing data in correlation analysis [147]. Data quality was verified through attention check questions (Question 8a), with 97.6% of participants responding correctly, indicating high engagement and data reliability. Open-ended responses (n=84 for concerns, n=59 for priorities) were analysed using qualitative thematic analysis [148]. To ensure methodological rigor and result validation,

the primary statistical analysis was independently verified using an alternative computational approach, confirming the study's main finding of the "Cooperation Paradox" [132].

#### 4. Results and Discussion

The following analysis presents survey findings organised according to the three research questions established in Section 1.2. Each dimension -economic, sociological, and political- traces the pathway from policy inputs through experienced impacts to attitudinal outcomes, revealing the Cooperation Paradox and selective deglobalisation. The methodology flowchart (Figure 1) guided the integration of qualitative and quantitative findings, analysed in dialogue with theoretical frameworks to identify patterns and contradictions informing the 'selective deglobalisation' concept.

##### 4.1. RQ1: Economic Dimensions: The Macro Personal Disconnect

Economic impacts showed 67.9% (n=142) for Question 3 a strong negative country-level impact and 51.2% (n=107) for Question 4 a negative sector-level perceptions, while 49.3% (N=103) reported in Question 7 personal financial deterioration, revealing a macro-personal disconnect ( $r=-0.44$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Only 16.3% (n=34) perceiving positive effects, and 15.8% (n=33) indicating no impact or uncertainty. Those findings align with economic literature that is documenting welfare losses from Trump's tariffs [7; 61; 91; 118; 149; 150].

Country-specific analysis shows variation: German respondents report the highest negative impact (79.4%), consistent with IFO Institute projections [151; 152], followed by UK (69.6%) and US respondents (55.2%), supporting Stiglitz's [43] argument that Trump's policies harm America itself.

Trade-exposed sectors demonstrate heterogeneity (Automotive, Manufacturing, Trade / Logistics) 59.2% report negative impacts, while protected sectors (IT, Healthcare, Finance) show only 46.8% negative impacts. The correlation between country and sector assessments ( $r=0.61$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) indicates that there is consistent impact perceptions across levels of analysis, validating measurement approaches and suggesting consistency to evaluate policy impacts.

Besides negative impact perceptions, trade policy attitudes demonstrate nuance. Question 5 shows 51.7% (n=108) oppose or strongly oppose using tariffs to protect domestic industries and only 26.3% (n=55) support them. This opposition to tariffs despite their stated protective intent reflects sophisticated understanding of trade economics consistent with Blanchard, Bown, and Johnson's [63] explanation of supply chain effects and Baqaee and Farhi [64; 65] analysis of tariff shock propagation through networks. It is interesting that, 56.0% (n=117) believe that their country should prioritise domestic production over cheaper foreign goods, yet 51.7% are against tariffs to achieve this goal. The positive correlation between these measures ( $r = 0.28$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) suggests, that domestic prioritisation objectives are supported by many respondents but tariffs not considered as the right mechanisms, possibly preferring alternative industrial policies.

The macro-personal disconnect came out (emerged) as a critical finding: 67.9% of the respondents perceive negative country-level impacts, only 49.3% (n=103) report that they have

personal financial deterioration, with 37.3% (n=78) experiencing no change. This disconnect ( $r=-0.44$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) suggests complex transmission mechanisms not captured by aggregate economic projections [7; 74]. Qualitative responses from 84 respondents emphasise “inflation” (mentioned 12 times), “cost increases” (8 times), “uncertainty” (6 times), and “supply chain disruption” (5 times), aligning with empirical findings of complete tariff pass-through to consumer prices [119; 153].

In summary, addressing RQ1, individuals experience predominantly negative economic effects (67.9%), with German respondents highest (79.4%). The macro-personal disconnect ( $r = -0.44$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) reveals complex transmission mechanisms, while opposition to tariffs (51.7%) despite domestic production support (56.0%) suggests sophisticated public understanding of trade economics.

#### ***4.2. RQ2: Sociological Dimensions: Institutional Distrust and Cultural Resilience***

In contradiction to cultural backlash theories [52; 54], Question 9 reveals low cultural threat perceptions: only 30.6% (n=64) agree that “Globalisation threatens my country’s identity and values,” compared to 49.3% (n=103) who disagree ( $M=2.66$ ,  $SD=1.37$ ). This contrasts with assumptions linking import competition to cultural nationalism [53; 54].

Elite trust patterns show that people don't trust political and business leadership. A total of 66.0% (n=138) disagree in Questions 10 and 10A that political leaders make decisions helping workers, with only 12.9% (n=27) agreeing. 60.1% (n=125) express distrust in decisions made by business leaders. This elite distrust aligns with populist narratives that were identified by Rodrik [25] and help to explain the “Trump effect” on trade attitudes [56], consistent with research linking declining trust to populist voting patterns [154; 155] but also findings that democratic norms are undermined by elite rhetoric [14; 92].

Economic anxiety levels demonstrate moderation, with only 22.0% (n=46) reporting high worry about economic futures due to globalisation, whilst 44.0% (n=92) express no worry. Mean anxiety levels ( $M=2.35$ ,  $SD=0.95$ ) are lower than expected given negative impact perceptions, suggesting resilience or adaptation to globalisation pressures. This contradicts predictions from economic insecurity literature [97,98] and indicates that whilst Trump's policies generate negative assessments, they do not fundamentally undermine personal economic security perceptions.

Demographic analysis reveals remarkable consistency across age cohorts in negative impact perceptions: 18-29 years (65.9%), 30-44 years (67.4%), 45-59 years (67.9%), and 60+ years (70.6%).

This uniformity is different from conventional theories of generational difference [156; 157] and implies that Trump’s impact goes beyond the usual age-based political divides. Geographic patterns suggest that even though the US is Trump’s home country, where policies should presumably help people, most US respondents (55.2%) are still negative, while there are more positive replies (25.3%) than in other countries.

In comparison, Germany has 79.4% negative responses and only 8.8% positive responses, which is in line with Europe's higher level of trade exposure. The tiny samples from emerging nations don't let us draw any judgements about how the effects are different.

In summary, addressing RQ2, Trump's nationalist narratives have not generated widespread cultural threat perceptions (30.6% agreement), but reinforced distrust in political (66.0%) and business (60.1%) elites. Consistent negative perceptions across age cohorts (65.9%–70.6%) suggest Trump's impact transcends generational divides, while moderate anxiety levels indicate resilience to globalisation pressures.

### ***4.3. RQ3: Political Dimensions: The Cooperation Paradox***

The most significant finding emerges in political dimensions: despite widespread negative impact perceptions and institutional skepticism, 85.2% (n=178) agree that "Countries should work together through international agreements," with only 4.3% (n=9) disagreeing. The mean score of 4.38 (SD=0.89) indicates strong consensus for cooperation. This demonstrates the central theoretical contribution—the cooperation paradox where negative experiences with protectionism paradoxically strengthen rather than weaken support for international cooperation (see Appendix A, Table A3 for details).

Question 13 reveals moderate institutional trust, with 37.3% (n=78) expressing "little trust" in international organisations like the UN, WTO, and World Bank, 45.5% (n=95) having "some trust," and 14.8% (n=31) expressing "high trust." This erosion of institutional confidence aligns with Hopewell's [10; 60] analysis of declining US support for multilateral institutions, Zaccaria's [103] documentation of the WTO crisis and recent analyses of institutional challenges under Trump's return to power [11; 12]. However, the dominance of "some trust" over complete distrust suggests institutional resilience despite challenges, supporting Ikenberry's [9] argument that whilst hegemonic organisation weakens, underlying principles of liberal internationalism remain relevant.

The relationship between national and global interest priorities shows pragmatic flexibility, with 52.2% (n=109) selecting "depends on the situation," indicating contextual decision-making. Only 40.7% (n=85) lean toward national interests, whilst 7.2% (n=15) prioritise global interests. This reflects complex balancing described by Börzel and Zürn [26] between sovereignty and cooperation.

Future global integration preferences demonstrate optimism: 56.5% (n=118) believe countries should be more connected in 10 years, whilst 29.7% (n=62) prefer more independence. This positive preference for integration despite current disruptions suggests temporal differentiation in policy assessment—rejecting recent approaches whilst maintaining long-term integration goals, consistent with emerging patterns where new forms of multilateral collaboration develop even as established institutions weaken [117]. Open-ended responses (n=59) emphasise cooperation themes: "cooperation of all countries," "Free trade, everywhere and everyone," and "Countries should work together through international agreements."

The cooperation paradox is evidenced by a statistically significant negative correlation ( $r=-0.20$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) between negative country effect perceptions (Q3) and cooperative support (Q15).

This is a contradiction to established theories linking economic harm to isolationism [25; 53; 97; 98; 158] and suggest rational policy learning where negative experiences with protectionism enhance appreciation for cooperative alternatives. In addition other supporting correlations include strong cooperation–future connectivity alignment ( $r=0.55$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) and institutional trust-cooperation relationships ( $r=0.38$ ,  $p<0.001$ ), they confirm consistent pro-multilateral orientations (see Appendix A for complete correlation matrix).


In summary, addressing RQ3, despite negative impact perceptions and institutional scepticism, cooperation support remains high (85.2%), with the significant negative correlation ( $r = -0.20$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) confirming the Cooperation Paradox. This challenges theories predicting isolationist backlash and suggests that negative protectionist experiences paradoxically strengthen multilateral preferences through rational policy learning.

## 5. Conclusions

### 5.1. Theoretical Contributions

The central theoretical contribution is the Cooperation Paradox: 67.9% perceive negative impacts from Trump’s policies, yet 85.2% strongly support international cooperation, contradicting theories linking economic harm to isolationism [53].

Figure 2 presents the COPAR (COoperation PARadox) framework, illustrating how this paradox emerges through the pathway from policy inputs through experienced impacts to attitudinal outcomes.



**Figure 2.** The COPAR (COoperation PARadox) Framework.

Source: Authors' Own Elaboration.

The paradox can be explained through rational policy learning – respondents recognise that unilateral protectionism generates costs without corresponding benefits, as evidenced by 51.7% opposing tariffs despite 56.0% supporting domestic production. Rather than retreating into isolationism, publics appear to demand better multilateralism, not less globalisation. This motivates the concept of “selective deglobalisation.”

Selective deglobalisation extends beyond “slowbalisation” [20] or “major setbacks” [45] by capturing active preference formation where negative protectionist experiences generate support for enhanced multilateral cooperation instead of simply further retreat. This challenges binary globalisation conceptualisations, revealing sophisticated public evaluation distinguishing harmful policy instruments from beneficial institutional frameworks.

The study reveals three empirical patterns. First, the macro-personal disconnect ( $r=-0.44$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) demonstrates complex mediating factors that existing economic models inadequately capture [7; 74]. Second, absence of age differences in impact perceptions (65.9-70.6% negative across cohorts) challenges generational divide theories [52; 156], suggesting unified rather than divisive effects. Third, the cooperation paradox ( $r=-0.20$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) — the central finding captured by the COPAR framework -contradicts theories linking economic harm to isolationism [25; 53], indicating rational policy learning where protectionist failures enhance appreciation for reformed multilateralism.

Technology adds explanatory power to understanding selective deglobalisation. The same digital technologies that enabled hyper-globalisation now allow selective international participation [29; 30], with digital trade and platform services less vulnerable to tariff barriers [159]. While states increasingly weaponize digital networks for economic coercion [160], this paradoxically drives support for reformed multilateral governance. Respondents can rationally reject harmful tariff policies while supporting international cooperation because modern technologies enable differentiated approaches—robust digital engagement alongside greater autonomy in physical supply chains. Unlike previous protectionist eras where retreat meant isolation, Industry 4.0 capabilities enable strategic positioning across integration dimensions, making selective deglobalisation operationally possible.

## ***5.2. Policy Implications***

The cooperation paradox is suggesting that protectionist experiences paradoxically increase American public support for multilateral engagement, however a reform of institutions is required rather than abandonment, given the moderate trust.

The findings suggest a leadership vacuum in global trade governance. United States’ protectionist policies are perceived as the source of the problem, an assessment shared by a majority of its own citizens (55.2%), so its credibility to lead a multilateral repair effort is diminished. In contrast, the data shows European nations have the strongest motive to fill this void. German respondents reported the highest negative effect rates (79.4%), and overall European negativity exceeded that of the United States. This combination of leadership vacuum and a motivated European bloc gives strong empirical justification for EU to take over leadership in calling for alternative frameworks, aligning with Sapir’s [114] recommendations for EU-led multilateral initiatives and is supported by the broad public support for cooperation

discovered in this study. This leadership has to realize that modern technology capabilities allow for more nuanced approaches to international economic policy than previous binary globalisation-versus protectionism choices. Besides unfavorable experiences, 85.2% support for collaboration implies that the public prefers improved multilateral frameworks over protectionist alternatives.

Policymakers from Europe can this support to form coalitions with the “connector” nations highlighted by Gopinath et al. [117], this results in new institutional arrangements that preserve integration benefits while addressing legitimate concerns about economic disruption. From implementation perspective, EU-led multilateral initiatives should establish standards for cross-border data flows and address digital fragmentation through coordinated rather than unilateral measures [36; 37; 39–41].

### **5.3. Limitations and Future Research**

The findings are limited by several limitations. The sampling approach is limiting generalisability, because the sample is concentrated in developed economies (85% from US/UK/EU), this could potentially miss perspectives from emerging markets. The cross-sectional design makes it impossible to draw conclusions about how attitudes change over time. The 209-response sample size is good enough to find strong patterns, but it makes it hard to do detailed subgroup analyses. English-only administration may exclude important non-Anglophone perspectives where Trump's policies have significant impacts.

Future studies should look into the factors that connect overall economic effects with individual experiences, the conditions that cause differences in globalisation attitudes between generations to appear or disappear, and how “connector” countries help selective deglobalisation. It would be good to do experimental testing of policy framing, how this effects cooperation support and to expand the geographic coverage by using automated tools for translation of the survey into the languages of the potential respondents would enhance generalisability.

While in this paper the cooperation paradox is identified as well as the selective deglobalisation is introduced with attention to technology's role, technological mechanism is not empirically measured. Future studies should look into how specific capabilities – automation levels, digital infrastructure, and Industry 4.0 adoption – interact with trade policy impacts and cooperation attitudes in countries that have different technological development levels.

### **5.4. Final Reflections**

Other scholars shall be challenged by the findings of this study, especially the cooperation paradox, to reconsider assumptions about how economic harm shapes political preferences, suggesting that negative experiences with protectionism may serve as learning opportunities, which enhance rather than diminish support for international cooperation. Instead of confirming theoretical predictions of isolationist backlash, this study discovers complex reality where negative experiences paradoxically strengthen commitments to multilateralism.

The concept of selective deglobalisation, which is embedded in both political and technological contexts is providing both theoretical advancement and practical guidance for navigating an era

of global economic transformation. By studying how people around the world experience and respond to protectionist experiments, this study helps to build long-term frameworks for international cooperation that balance integration gains with democratic legitimacy. The cooperation paradox suggests that even in periods of apparent deglobalisation, underlying support for reformed international cooperation remains robust, offering hope for constructive global governance renewal.

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**Ethical Approval:** The conduction of this study was done in accordance with ethical guidelines for human subjects research. Before participation, all survey participants provided informed consent through the survey introduction. Opinions on trade policies were collected anonymous without any personal information. Participation was voluntary and participants could withdraw at any time. Formal ethics committee approval was not required for this minimal-risk study as determined by institutional guidelines for anonymous survey research. Information were collected without personal identifying information and therefore with minimal risk to participants. No participants are identifiable in this research.

**Appendix A.** Correlation Matrix and Statistical Analysis.**Table A1.** Descriptive Statistics for Survey Variables (N = 209).

Variable	Description	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Q3	Country Impact (1=Positive, 5=Negative)	3.68	1.12	1	5
Q4	Sector Impact (1=Positive, 5=Negative)	3.41	1.08	1	5
Q5	Tariff Support (1=Oppose, 5=Support)	2.69	1.31	1	5
Q6	Domestic Priority (1=No, 4=Yes)	2.89	0.74	1	4
Q7	Personal Finance (1=Worse, 5=Better)	2.54	0.96	1	5
Q9	Cultural Threat (1=Low, 5=High)	2.66	1.37	1	5
Q10	Political Trust (1=Low, 5=High)	2.35	1.24	1	5
Q11	Limit Foreign (1=Disagree, 5=Agree)	2.97	1.42	1	5
Q12	Economic Worry (1=Low, 5=High)	2.35	0.95	1	5
Q13	Intl Org Trust (1=Low, 5=High)	2.74	0.84	1	5
Q14	Priorities (1=National, 3=Global)	1.73	0.61	1	3
Q15	Cooperation (1=Disagree, 5=Agree)	4.38	0.89	1	5
Q16	Future Connect (1=Independent, 3=Connected)	2.27	0.64	1	3

**Table A2.** Pearson Correlation Matrix (N = 207 After Listwise Deletion).

	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16
Q3	1.00												
Q4	.61***	1.00											
Q5	-.26***	-.22**	1.00										
Q6	-.06	-.03	.28***	1.00									
Q7	-.44***	-.37***	.18*	.07	1.00								
Q9	.11	.08	.29***	.22**	-.10	1.00							
Q10	-.24***	-.20**	.14	.01	.12	.20**	1.00						
Q11	.13	.10	.36***	.22**	-.08	.51***	.21**	1.00					
Q12	.26***	.23**	-.14	-.03	-.22**	.22**	-.22**	.19*	1.00				
Q13	-.23**	-.17*	.20**	.12	.20**	-.22**	.13	-.17*	-.20**	1.00			
Q14	-.08	-.02	-.04	-.18*	.17*	-.17*	.01	-.19*	-.13	.20**	1.00		

Q15	-.20**	-.14	-.23**	-.15	.15	-.32***	.02	-.37***	-.26***	.38***	.33***	1.00	
Q16	-.16*	-.12	-.15	-.17*	.18*	-.32***	-.01	-.40***	-.25***	.31***	.36***	.55***	1.00

Note: \*\*\* p < .001, \*\* p < .01, \* p < .05 (two-tailed tests)

**Table A3.** Key Correlations Supporting Research Findings.

Finding	Variables	r	p	95% CI	Interpretation
1. The Cooperation Paradox	Country Impact (Q3) × Cooperation Support (Q15)	-.20	< .01	[-.33, -.06]	Respondents perceiving greater negative impacts show INCREASED support for international cooperation
2. Impact Perception Consistency	Country Impact (Q3) × Sector Impact (Q4)	.61	< .001	[.51, .69]	Strong positive correlation validates consistent impact perceptions across analytical levels
3. Personal-Macro Disconnect	Country Impact (Q3) × Personal Finance (Q7)	-.44	< .001	[-.55, -.31]	Moderate negative correlation reveals disconnect between macro-economic perceptions and personal experiences
4. Pro-Multilateral Consistency	Cooperation Support (Q15) × Future Connect (Q16)	.55	< .001	[.44, .64]	Strong positive correlation confirms consistent pro-multilateral orientation

**Table A4.** Correlation Patterns by Theoretical Dimension.

Economic Dimension (Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6, Q7)		
Relationship	Correlation	Significance
Impact measures (Q3-Q4)	r = .61	p < .001
Country Impact-Tariff Support (Q3-Q5)	r = -.26	p < .001
Country Impact-Personal Finance (Q3-Q7)	r = -.44	p < .001
Sector Impact-Personal Finance (Q4-Q7)	r = -.37	p < .001
Tariff Support - Domestic Priority (Q5-Q6)	r = -.28	p < .001
Sociological Dimension (Q9, Q10, Q11, Q12)		
Cultural Threat-Limit Foreign (Q9-Q11)	r = .51	p < .001
Country Impact-Economic Worry (Q3-Q12)	r = .26	p < .001
Country Impact-Political Trust (Q3-Q10)	r = -.24	p < .001
Political Trust-Limit Foreign (Q10-Q11)	r = .21	p < .01
Political Dimension (Q13, Q14, Q15, Q16)		
Cooperation-Future Connect (Q15-Q16)	r = .55	p < .001
Intl Org Trust-Cooperation (Q13-Q15)	r = .38	p < .001
Priorities-Future Connect (Q14-Q16)	r = .36	p < .001
Priorities-Cooperation (Q14-Q15)	r = .33	p < .001

Methodological Notes: (1) Correlations calculated using Pearson's r with pairwise deletion; (2) Significance tests are two-tailed (3) Sample size varies from 195-207 due to missing data; (4) Listwise deletion for complete correlation matrix reduces N to 207; (5) All variables checked for normality, transformations not required; (6) No evidence of multicollinearity issues (all VIF < 3.0) = Variance Inflation Factor.

## Appendix B. Statistical Formulas and Calculations.

### B.1. Percentage Calculation

This formula is used for findings such as the 67.9% who reported negative country impact.

Mathematical Formula

$$\text{Percentage (\%)} = (\text{Part/Whole}) \times 100$$

Detailed Mathematical Notation

- Part: The number of respondents who gave a specific answer (the subgroup of interest)
- Whole: The total number of valid respondents for that question

Step-by-Step Calculation Example: Q3 Negative Impact

1. Identify the Part: Count respondents who answered "Negative" or "Very negative"
  - Part = 142
2. Identify the Whole: Count total valid responses for this question
  - Whole = 209
3. Apply the Formula:
 
$$(142/209) \times 100 = 0.6794 \times 100 = 67.94\%$$
4. Round to One Decimal Place:
  - Result: 67.9%

### B.2. 95% Confidence Interval for a Proportion

This calculates the margin of error, such as the  $\pm 6.3\%$  for negative country impact.

Mathematical Formula

$$ME = z \times \sqrt{[\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})/n]}$$

$$CI = \hat{p} \pm ME$$

Detailed Mathematical Notation

- ME: Margin of Error
- $\hat{p}$  (p-hat): The sample proportion (percentage as decimal, e.g., 67.9% = 0.679)
- n: Total sample size for the question
- z: Z-score for confidence level (95% CI = 1.96)
- CI: Confidence Interval

Step-by-Step Calculation Example: 95% CI for Q3 Negative Impact

1. Define Variables:
  - $\hat{p} = 0.679$  (67.9%)
  - $n = 209$
  - $z = 1.96$
2. Calculate  $\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})$ :
 
$$0.679 \times (1-0.679) = 0.679 \times 0.321 = 0.217959$$
3. Calculate Standard Error:
 
$$\sqrt{(0.217959/209)} = \sqrt{0.0010428} \approx 0.03229$$

4. Calculate Margin of Error:  
ME =  $1.96 \times 0.03229 \approx 0.0633$
5. Convert ME to Percentage:  
 $0.0633 \times 100 = 6.33\%$
6. Final Result:
  - $67.9\% \pm 6.3\%$

### B.3. Pearson's Correlation Coefficient (r)

This formula calculates all correlation matrix values, such as  $r = -0.20$  for the “Cooperation Paradox.” It measures the strength and direction of linear relationships between two numerical variables.

#### Mathematical Formula

$$r = \frac{\sum(x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y})}{\sqrt{[\sum(x_i - \bar{x})^2 \times \sum(y_i - \bar{y})^2]}}$$

#### Detailed Mathematical Notation

- r: Pearson correlation coefficient
- n: Number of pairs of data (respondents with valid answers for both questions)
- $\Sigma$ : Summation symbol (add all following values)
- $x_i$ : Individual score of respondent i on first variable (e.g., Q3 answer)
- $\bar{x}$  (x-bar): Mean score for first variable
- $y_i$ : Individual score of respondent i on second variable (e.g., Q15 answer)
- $\bar{y}$  (y-bar): Mean score for second variable

#### Step-by-Step Conceptual Calculation

For calculating  $r = -0.20$  between Q3 (Country Impact) and Q15 (Cooperation Support):

1. Prepare Data: Extract numerical scores for Q3 (x) and Q15 (y) for each of the 207 respondents.
2. Calculate Means: Compute average scores for Q3 ( $\bar{x}$ ) and Q15 ( $\bar{y}$ )
  - Mean of Q3 ( $\bar{x}$ ) = 3.68
  - Mean of Q15 ( $\bar{y}$ ) = 4.38
3. Calculate Deviations: For each respondent, compute the deviation from the mean::
  - $(x_i - 3.68)$  and  $(y_i - 4.38)$
4. Calculate Numerator (Covariance):
  - For each respondent: multiply their two deviation scores
  - Sum all products:  $\sum(x_i - \bar{x})(y_i - \bar{y}) = -34.59$
5. Calculate Denominator:
  - Square each Q3 deviation and sum:  $\sum(x_i - \bar{x})^2 = 257.92$
  - Square each Q15 deviation and sum:  $\sum(y_i - \bar{y})^2 = 160.62$
  - Multiply the two sums and take square root  $\approx 173.34$
6. Final Calculation:  
 $r = \text{Numerator} / \text{Denominator} = -34.59 / 173.34$
7. Result:  $r = -0.20$

#### Interpretation

- $r = -0.20$ : This indicates a weak-to-moderate negative correlation.
- $p < .01$ : The relationship is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.

- Meaning: As country impact perceptions become more negative (a higher score on Q3), support for international cooperation also tends to increase (a higher score on Q15). This is the statistical basis of the "Cooperation Paradox."

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